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Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: New Ground
for the Government Contractor Defense
In the past decade manufacturers of military equipment have benefited
from a defense premised on the "sharing" of the United States' immunity to
suit. 1 This defense, which courts have given a variety of names, 2 developed in
response to products liability claims challenging the design of equipment sold to
the United States. The government contractor defense generally has protected
military contractors by extending the United States' immunity to suit by mem3
bers of the armed forces under the Feres-Stenceldoctrine.
Since 1983 a majority of circuit courts of appeals have recognized the government contractor defense based on Feres-Stencel. Despite this consensus, the
circuits have disagreed about the exact elements of the defense and its application. In addition, the very reasoning behind the government contractor defense
has been sharply criticized. 4 The Supreme Court recently entered the controversy surrounding government contractor liability in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.5 Although the Court upheld the government contractor defense, it
rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as its basis. The Court relied instead on a
broader category of sovereign immunity-the discretionary function exception
6
to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
This Note outlines the pre-Boyle status of the government contractor defense and analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision. The Note
argues that the transition to discretionary function immunity as the basis for
insulating government contractors from liability provides the defense with logical consistency and strength. The Note concludes that the reasoning employed
in Boyle will facilitate extending the government contractor defense to nonmilitary government contractors, and that the hardships worked by the defense result inevitably from its origin in discretionary function immunity.
David A. Boyle, a United States Marine Corps lieutenant and helicopter
copilot, died on April 27, 1983, when his CH-53D helicopter crashed off the
1. See Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign Immunity after McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 181 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Sharingthe Protective Cloak]. Commentators have maintained steadfastly that the government
contractor defense is actually a form of extended or "shared" sovereign immunity even though it
operates as an affirmative defense. Eg., Turner & Sutin, The Government ContractorDefense: When
Are Manufacturersof Military Equipment Shieldedfrom Liabilityfor Design Defects?, 52 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 397 (1986); Note, The Government ContractDefense in ProductLiability Suits: Lethal Weapon
for Non-Military Government Contractors, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Lethal Weapon].
2. See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir. 1985) ("military contractor defense"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983) ("government contractor defense"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("government
contract defense").
3. For a discussion of the Feres-Stenceldoctrine, see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
4. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 745; infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
6. Id. at 2517-18; see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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coast of Virginia during a training exercise. 7 Boyle and the helicopter's three

other crew members survived the impact of the crash. The other three crew

8
members reached safety through emergency exits; Boyle did not and drowned.

An investigation after the crash suggested that Boyle did not escape either because equipment obstructed access to the copilot's emergency escape handle, or
9
because the hatch itself opened outward, rendering it useless in an ocean crash.
Boyle's father brought a state wrongful death action against Sikorsky Divi-

sion of United Technologies Corporation (Sikorosky), which manufactured the
helicopter for the United States. Boyle sought to recover on theories of products
liability' 0 and negligent repair.11 At trial in the Federal District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Boyle

and awarded him $725,000 in damages. 12 The United States Court of Appeals
13
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, invoking the "military contractor defense"' it
14
had announced the same day in Tozer v. LTV Corp. In Tozer the Fourth Cir-

cuit adopted the formulation of the military contractor defense the Ninth Circuit had set forth in McKay v. Rockwell InternationalCorp.15 By adopting the
McKay formulation, the Fourth Circuit joined the majority view of the
defense. 16
Boyle petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, challenging the authority of the court of appeals to recognize the defense in the absence of federal
18
legislation, 17 the McKay formulation of the defense adopted in Tozer, and the
7. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
8. Id.
9. The testimony of the surviving crew members indicated that the helicopter rolled to the
copilot's side upon impact and began taking on water. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Boyle
(No. 86-492).
10. Boyle alleged two design defects in support of his products liability claim: first, the flight
control system lacked an override mechanism to contend with failure of the main system; and second, the outward action of the escape hatch rendered the craft uncrashworthy over water. Id. at 912.
11. The cause of the crash itself presumably was a metal chip that contaminated the servo, a
part of the helicopter's automatic flight system. Boyle contended that this chip entered the system
during repairs Sikorsky had performed for the United States. Id. at 5-8.
12. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 413 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S.Ct.
2510 (1988).
13. Id. at 416. The Fourth circuit reversed the district court's denial of Sikorsky's motion for
J.N.O.V.
14. 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct 2897 (1988). The same day it
decided Boyle and Tozer, the Fourth Circuit handed down Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2897 (1988), a third case involving the defense. In all three cases
the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of the newly announced defense.
15. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). For a discussion of McKay, see infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
16. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting a test substantially
similar to McKay); In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d 115, 121-23 (3d Cir. 1985) (same), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting the
McKay defense exactly); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3rd Cir. 1985) (same),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). But see Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 795
(11 th Cir. 1985) (rejecting McKay), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2896 (1988).
17. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4-10, Boyle (No. 86-492).
18. Id. at 18-20.
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application of the defense to the facts in Boyle.1 9 Writing for the five-four majority, Justice Scalia affirmed the federal courts' power to preempt state tort law
in the area of government procurement contracts. 20 The Court then adopted the

critical elements of the McKay defense while rejecting its reasoning. 2 1 In its
place the Court adopted a new justification for the defense based on the discre22
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle nearly every jurisdiction to
consider the issue of government contractor liability had acknowledged some
form of defense available to manufacturers of equipment designed by the government. 23 A majority ofjurisdictions recognizing the defense followed the McKay
formulation. 24 .
McKay arose out of the deaths of two Navy pilots in unrelated accidents
involving RA-5C "Vigilante" airplanes manufactured by Rockwell International. 25 Autopsies of the two pilots suggested that injuries sustained during
ejection caused their deaths. 26 The pilots' widows brought wrongful death actions premised on negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability under the
19. Id. at 13-15. Although the Supreme Court in Boyle upheld the government contractor
defense itself, it noted that the court of appeals' opinion did not clarify whether the court had determined that no reasonable jury could find for the defendant, or whether the court incorrectly had
conducted its own evaluation of the evidence supporting the defense. The court therefore remanded
the case for resolution of this point. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519.
20. Id. at 2513-15; see infra notes 77-108 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and White joined Justice Scalia's opinion. Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined the dissent filed by Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. For a
discussion of the dissents see infra notes 88, 96 & 128 and accompanying text.
21. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517-18.
22. Id. at 2518. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the federal government's general sovereign immunity. The Act reserves specific exceptions to the consent to suit, including the exception
for suits "based upon the performance . . . [ofl a discretionary function." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(1982). See generally Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1958-60 (1988) (discussing scope
of discretionary function exception); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-69 (1955)
(same); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-36 (1953) (same).
23. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying McKay defense),
cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 745-46 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (setting forth a distinct form of the defense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); In re Air
Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d 115, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying a defense substantially similar to
McKay), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1092 (1986); Tillet v. J.I Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 1985)
(applying McKay defense); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (setting forth government contractor defense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D. Kan. 1983) (acknowledging a defense but upholding liability); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 792-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (same), rev'd, 685
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 8-9, 364 A.2d 43, 46-47 (App. Div. 1976) (articulating a defense), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super.
407 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). But see Challoner v.
Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir.) (refusing to recognize a defense), vacated on
other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1973).
24. See supra note 23. For a discussion of the development of the government contractor defense before McKay, see Note, Sharing the Protective Cloak, supra note 1, at 183-98; Note, Liability
ofa Manufacturerfor ProductsDefectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L, REV. 1025, 103264 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Liability of a Manufacturer]; Note, McKay v. Rockwell International
Corp.: No Compulsion Required For Government Contractor Defense, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1061,
1069-73 (1984) [hereinafter Note, No Compulsion Required]; Note, Lethal Weapon, supra note 1, at
1133-43.
25. McKay, 704 F.2d at 446.
26. Id.
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Death on the High Seas Act.27 The trial court imposed liability for the design of
the ejection system and awarded plaintiffs modest damages. 28 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, adopting the "government con'29
tractor defense."
The McKay court cited Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co.30 as the source of
the defense. 31 In Yearsley the Supreme Court announced the existence of a government contractor defense in cases involving public works projects. 32 McKay
33
combined the Yearsley defense with the generic contract specification defense
34
to create a new defense specific to military equipment contractors.
The defense announced in McKay provides that a manufacturer shall not be
liable for product design when it can demonstrate that
(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres and Stencel [immunity requirement], (2) ... the United States established, or approved,
reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment [approval requirement], (3) the equipment conformed to those specifications [conformity requirement], and (4) the supplier warned the United
States about patent errors in the government's specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
3 5
but not to the United States [disclosure requirement].
These four elements reflect the McKay court's primary justification for the de36
fense the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
27. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1982) (granting federal jurisdiction for claims arising out of deaths
that occur more than one marine league from United States territory).
28. McKay, 704 F.2d at 447.
29. Id. at 455. The court remanded the case for a determination of the defense's application to
the facts. Judge Alarcon dissented, questioning strongly the reasons for the decision. He reasoned
that manufacturers with good safety records would obtain liability insurance at a lower rate than
their competitors with worse records. Lower liability insurance costs would lead to lower bids,
which the government could then pursue. Id. at 456-64 (Alarcon, J., dissenting); see Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-43 (1lth Cir. 1985) (reiterating bases for the McKay dissent), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
30. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
31. McKay, 704 F.2d at 448.
32. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 23. Yearsley involved the erosion of private property caused by dikes
the defendant constructed for the United States. The property owner sought to recover under the
takings clause of the fifth amendment. The Court imposed no liability on the ground that the defendant had constructed the dikes according to government plans. The Yearsley defense was subsequently used in similar public works cases. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th
Cir. 1963) (road construction); Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d
14, 15-17 (9th Cir. 1961) (dam construction); O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 18788 (D. Vt. 1979) (road construction); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827
(D. Conn. 1965) (river dredging).
33. The contract specification defense bars manufacturer liability for the negligent design of a
product when the manufacturer complied with specifications supplied by a party with superior
knowledge in the field. See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer,supra note 24, at 1032-55 (comparing
contract specification defense with government contractor defense); Note, No Compulsion Required,
supra note 24, at 1069-73 (same).
34. McKay, 704 F.2d at 448-49; see Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1985)
(discussion of the overlapping between the government contractor defense and the contract specification defense in McKay); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564-67 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
35. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
36. Id. at 448-49.
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In Feres v. United States37 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity with

regard to injuries suffered by United States military personnel in the course of
relaservice.3 8 The Feres Court justified this limited immunity by the unique
39
tionship between the government and members of its armed forces.
Stencel Aero EngineeringCorp. v. United States40 extended Feres to insulate

the government from indemnification of military equipment manufacturers for
their liability to members of the United States armed forces. The Stencel Court
reasoned that indemnification of manufacturers would counteract the government's immunity from direct liability to military personnel. 4 1 The Court also

stressed the need to maintain military discipline and to prevent judicial "secondguessing [of] military orders" 42 as justifications for the government's immunity.
The McKay court noted several Feres-Stencelrationales supporting the government contractor defense. The most important of these rationales was the

stressed in Stencel-prevention of judicial interferseparation of powers concern
43
ence in military affairs.
The McKay court also cited Stencel's reasoning in favor of extending Feres

as support for the government contractor defense. Like indemnification of military equipment manufacturers, argued the court, government contractor liability
ultimately would result in the government's bearing the costs prohibited by
Feres.44 Government contractors would "pass-through" the costs of liability in

their initial contract price by including the cost of liability insurance. 45 This

37. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
38. Id. at 146. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal government cannot be
sued without the consent of Congress. See Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 599 (1982). Congress granted such consent subject to several important exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
The principle of governmental or sovereign immunity derives from the misunderstood English
maxim, "The King can do no wrong." See generally Note, supra, at 601-22 (discussing the history of
sovereign immunity). The United States Supreme Court adopted the concept in the nineteenth century. See Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274-76 (1868). In Elgin v. District of
Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the court summarized the reasons for the defense as
follows:
If a King, or a city council, is to do the job of governing well, then there is something to be
said for withholding the threat of answerability in damages for at least some of the actions
and decisions which governing necessarily entails. He who rules must make choices among
competing courses of action and in the face of conflicting considerations of policy. The
capacity and incentive to govern effective are arguably not enhanced by the prospect of
being sued by those citizens who may be adversely affected by the choice eventually made.
Thus it has been thought wise to sweep this restrictive cloud from the horizon and to let
those responsible for the conduct of public affairs calculate their courses of action free of
this intimidating influence.
Id. at 154.
39. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
40. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
41. Id. at 673.
42. Id.
43. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]o hold military suppliers
liable for defective designs where the United States set or approved design specifications would
thrust the judiciary into the making of military decisions."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
44. Id. at 449.
45. Id.
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result would undermine the Feres immunity; therefore the court adopted the
government contractor defense to protect the interests underlying Feres and
46
Stencel.
McKay identified several justifications for the government contractor defense in addition to furthering Feres-Stencel. These justifications grow out of the
military's special need to accelerate the development of new technology in the
interest of national defense.4 7 This need requires the government to incur risks
that would be unacceptable in the consumer market. The McKay court argued
that when the government actively assumes such risks through contract specifications, it would be unfair to hold the manufacturer liable for defects or dangers
in the design. 48 Furthermore, the existence of a defense premised on cooperation
with military experts would encourage military contractors to work closely with
49
the government to develop new equipment.
Having justified the government contractor defense, the McKay court set
forth the defense's four elements intended to isolate cases implicating the defense's Feres-Stencel basis. 5 0 The McKay court expressly rejected other cases
that required the contractor to demonstrate government compulsion regarding
the dangerous aspect of the design. 5 1 Instead, the court required only govern52
ment "approval" of "reasonably precise specifications" to raise the defense.
The McKay court specifically excepted from the operation of the defense cases
involving "defects in the manufacture" of equipment. 53 This exception merely
reiterated the requirement that the equipment conform to government specifications, because manufacturing defects by definition constitute nonconformance
with the design.
The Ninth Circuit did not have to resolve a preemption issue to decide
McKay because of its earlier decision that the Death on the High Seas Act pro46. Id.
47. Id. at 449-50.
48. Id. at 450.
49. Id. This reasoning was criticized in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). The court in Shaw commented,
We find the last McKay rationale-the notion that the military contractor defense encourages the military and its suppliers to work closely together, thereby making it easier to
discover who is responsible for product design-somewhat inscrutable. Indeed, on the
contrary, our experience is that the more closely the contractor and the military work
together, the more difficult it is to determine exactly who made the design decisions.
Id. at 743.
50. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451; see supra text accompanying note 35 (enumerating the four elements of the government contractor defense).
51. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450-51. The compulsion requirement was set forth in Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) and O'Keefe v. Boeing
Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d
246, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring that contractor must "execute the government specifications
carefully"); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D. Kan. 1983) (requiring that the
government specifications expressly call for the injury-causing feature of the product for the defense
to operate); Note, No Compulsion Required, supra note 24 (discussing generally McKay and the
compulsion requirement).
52. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
53. Id.
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vides an exclusive remedy displacing state law. 5 4 To insulate government contractors, however the defense would have to apply to claims premised on state
tort law. A later case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, Bynum v. FMC Corp.," resolved the preemption issue.
Bynum involved a products liability suit brought under Mississippi law by a
member of the state's National Guard.5 6 The district court granted summary
judgment for FMC based on its conclusion that Mississippi would accept the
government contractor defense.5 7 On appeal the Fifth Circuit declined to review the district court's state law decision. Instead, it adopted the McKay government contractor defense as a matter of federal law that preempted state tort
law. 58 The Bynum court's reasoning in favor of preemption substantially paralleled the McKay court's Feres-Stencel basis for the defense itself.5 9
The Bynum court began with the threshold question in any nonstatutory
60
preemption inquiry-whether the case involves a "uniquely federal" interest.
The court pointed to the Feres underpinnings of the McKay defense to demonstrate the defense's connection to a strong federal interest. 61 Noting that the
primary goal of the government contractor defense is to avoid judicial interference in military decision making, the Bynum court argued that the same concern
mandated federal preemption of state products liability law in suits against government contractors:
The plenary control of military judgments by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, however, is more than a separation of powers concern. The composition, training, equipping and
management of our military is a matter exclusively within the rights
and duties of the federal government and, as a result, any interference
with federal authority over national defense and military
affairs impli62
cates uniquely federal interests of the most basic sort.
Although the Bynum court stated that protection of the federal government's exclusive authority in military matters in and of itself warranted displacing state law,6 3 the court went on to examine the effect of preemption on state
54. Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983) (preemption of state
wrongful death claim necessary to achieve uniformity). The federal courts are divided on whether
the Death on the High Seas Act displaces state tort law. See Comment, Admiralty: Conflict of Law
on the High Seas-The States andDeath on the High Seas Act, 59 TULANE L. REv. 1487, 1494-1512
(1985).
55. 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
56. Plaintiff sustained severe injuries during a training exercise at Fort Stewart, Georgia, when
the M-548 cargo carrier in which he was riding swerved off a bridge into a creek. Id. at 558.
57. Id. at 560.
58. Id. at 566.
59. See id. at 560-63; McKay, 704 F.2d at 448-51.
60. See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 568; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (uniquely federal interest in antitrust enforcement); Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (no uniquely federal interest in asbestos
litigation).
61. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 569. The Supreme Court rejected Feres-Stencel as the basis for preemption in Boyle. See discussion infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
62. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 569.
63. Id.
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interests. The Bynum court first pointed out that a majority of courts to consider the issue had adopted the government contractor defense as state law. 64
The court then reviewed the arguments favoring strict products liability and
found them lacking in the nonconsumer context of government procurement
would not
contracts. 65 For these reasons the court concluded that state interests
66
suffer from preemption by the government contractor defense.
Not every court to consider the government contractor defense has accepted McKay and Bynum. In Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,67 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit strongly criticized both decisions. Shaw rejected McKay's pass-through cost rationale on the ground that
68
competitive bidding would prevent such costs from reaching the government.
Even if such costs did reach the government, argued the Shaw court, passthrough of the cost of liability insurance represents a more favorable method of
cost transfer than indemnification. The court concluded that the cost dispersing
69
effect of liability insurance renders McKay's analogy to Stencel inaccurate.
The Shaw court also noted that McKay's position on pass-through costs
was inconsistent with regard to costs of liability resulting from defects in manufacture. 70 To reflect Feres-Stencel accurately, the defense should apply whenever the government enjoys immunity. Under the McKay rule a United States
serviceman injured as a result of a mistake in manufacture could recover from
64. Id. at 571 (citing Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 249-54 (3d Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 21,
370 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1977), aff'd, 74 I11.2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,
144 N.J. Super. 1, 5, 364 A.2d 43, 46 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1977),
certification denied, 75 N.Y 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348,
350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)).
65. Id. The Bynum court listed four principal reasons for strict products liability: theories of
enterprise liability, market deterrence, compensation, and implied representation of safety. The
court dismissed the first two reasons as inapplicable because of the "inelastic" market for military
hardware and the government's interest in acquiring a specific piece of equipment at a reasonable
price. Compensating an injured serviceman does not require strict liability because the Veteran's
Benefits Act already provides guaranteed recovery. Finally, theories of warranty do not apply. According to the court, military servicemen, unlike normal consumers using commercial goods, do not
have an expectation of safety with regard to the equipment they use. Id. at 371-72.
The McKay court engaged in a similar analysis in considering the government contractor defense's application to federal claims. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 451-53.
66. Judge Pratt reached a similar conclusion in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 737, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980). "Agent Orange"
concerned a class action suit brought on behalf of Vietnam veterans against manufacturers of Agent
Orange, a chemical defoliant containing dioxin. Judge Pratt found the following federal interests
implicated in the suit: the government's relationship with and responsibility toward its soldiers, the
government's future relations with contractors, and the large number of veterans potentially included in the class. Id. at 746-47. See How-Downing, The Agent Orange Litigation: Should Federal
Common Law Have Been Applied?, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 611 (1983); Comment, In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation" Limiting the Use of Federal Common Law as the Basis for Federal
Question Jurisdiction in Private Litigation, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1027 (1982); Note, The PrattWeinstein Approach to Mass Tort Litigation, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 455, 463-69 (1986).
67. 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
68. Id. at 742. In this context the Shaw opinion echoed the criticisms of the dissent in McKay.
See supra note 29 (discussing the McKay dissent).
69. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742.
70. Id. at 742, n.10.
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the equipment supplier. 7 1 Feres, on the other hand, bars recovery by military
personnel against the government regardless of whether a design defect or defective manufacture caused the injury. Thus, the McKay test only partially succeeds
in preventing the pass-through of costs not permissible against the government
72
directly under Feres.
Having rejected McKay's reasons for the government contractor defense,

the Shaw court relied exclusively on separation of powers to tailor its version of
the defense. 73 In accordance with this narrower basis, Shaw argued for a greater
degree of required government involvement in the equipment specifications

greater than "approval" as permitted under McKay and subsequent cases. 74
The court in Shaw sought to ensure that the government, not the contractor, was
primarily responsible for the design in every stage of development. 75
The Shaw court also advocated a strict disclosure standard. The court con-

tended that manufacturers ought to be held to the standard of reasonable knowledge within the field with regard to both risks and alternative designs in order to
promote informed military decision making. 76 The Shaw court therefore developed a restricted form of the government contractor defense to correspond to its

narrower justification for the defense.
Shaw, Bynum, and McKay framed the issues for Supreme Court review of

the government contractor defense. These issues presented in Boyle were:
whether the government contractor defense preempts state tort law, the bases

for the defense, the requisite level of government involvement in design, and the
standard for contractor disclosure of risks under the defense. The Court re-

solved the first two issues but left some ambiguity about the remaining two. In
addition, the decision redirected the focus of the defense away from furthering

Feres-Stencelto protecting governmental discretionary functions. This new ba71. See McKay v. RockwellInt'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
72. The Supreme Court implicitly agreed with this criticism in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1988). In Boyle the Court called the test elements for the defense in
McKay "inexplicable" if Feres serves as the justification of the defense. Id.
73. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743.
74. Id. at 745-46; cf. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (same), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985) (same);
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir.) (requiring that the government "establish"
design specifications but construing establishment of design to include approval of design), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); McKay, 704 F.2d at 451 (requiring government approval of design).
But see Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 586 F. Supp. 711, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (rejecting the lenient
"approval" standard), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). For a discussion of the merits of the "approval" standard versus the "establishment" standard, see Turner &
Sutin, supra note 1, at 397; Note, Sharing the Protective Cloak, supra note I, at 200-01.
75. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 745.
76. Id. at 745. The Shaw version of the government contractor defense specifically would require a manufacturer to prove one of two alternatives:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of those products or parts of products shown to be defective; or (2) that it timely warned the military of
the risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known by the contractor, and that the military, although forewarned, clearly authorized the manufacturer to
proceed with the dangerous design.
Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
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sis for the defense extends its scope and increases the likelihood of further extending the defense by analogy.
The Boyle majority first upheld the Fourth Circuit's holding that the government contractor defense preempts state tort law. 7 7 The Court concluded that
the government contractor defense encompasses issues of "uniquely federal"
concern that warrant preemption even in the absence of express legislation. 7 8
The Boyle Court, however, did not identify Feres and Stencel as the implicated
federal interests. Instead, the Court based its decision on two traditional areas
of preemption: the rights of the United States under its contracts and the liability of federal employees for actions taken in the course of their employment.
First, the Court noted that federal law exclusively governs the rights and
obligations of the United States under its contracts. 79 Conceding that Boyle involved the tort liability of a government contractor to a third party, the Court
maintained that the case nevertheless implicated the government's rights under
its contracts. 80 Pointing to the now defunct requirement of privity to recover
against the manufacturer of a product, 81 the Court emphasized the relationship
between the contract and liability-performance of the contract gives rise to tort
82
liability.
The Boyle Court also drew a parallel between government contractor liability and the civil liability of federal employees for actions taken in the course of
their official duties. The Court concluded that although the defendant in Boyle
was a private contractor rather than a federal official, the case involved "the
same interest in getting the Government's work done."' 83 Citing Yearsley, the
public works case relied upon in McKay, 84 the Court commented that Yearsley
had come close to holding that a contractor is entitled to the immunity enjoyed
by federal employees. 85 The Court found no reason to distinguish between perand concluded that the logic emformance contracts and procurement contracts
86
ployed in Yearsley applied in Boyle as well.
The Court next argued that Boyle and suits like it potentially implicate important federal interests embodied in the terms of its procurement contracts.
Contractor liability to third persons would directly affect the government's ability to dictate the terms of future contracts: "[E]ither the contractor will decline
to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.
77. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513-15.
78. Id. at 2515-16.
79. Id. at 2514.
80. Id.
81. Virginia required privity between the plaintiff and the seller to recover in a design defect
suit until 1962. Id. (citing General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopolus, 203 Va. 66, 69-70, 122 S.E.2d 548,
551 (1961)). The state legislature officially eliminated this requirement in 1965. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.2-318 (1965).
82. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
83. Id. at 2515.
84. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
85. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
86. Id.
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Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected."' 87 The

Court concluded that government contractor liability constitutes an area of
uniquely federal interest by virtue of its proximity to other areas of federal concern and its capacity to affect the terms of government contracts.88 For this
reason, Boyle fell within the narrow category of cases that call for federal common law.
The Court next had to determine whether the government contractor area
requires displacement of state law because some of its prior decisions had incorporated state law as the federal common law.8 9 To resolve this question the
Court examined whether the case presented a "significant conflict" between a

federal policy and the operation of state law in the area of uniquely federal interest. 90 The Court stated the standard principle that preemption may occur only
to the extent that applying state law would frustrate an important federal concern. 9 1 In the area of procurement contracts, the Boyle Court recognized that
state tort law would not always conflict with federal interests and that the government contractor defense would preempt only in cases of "significant
92
conflict."
To illustrate the varying degrees to which state tort law might conflict with
the federal interest embodied in government contracts, the Court posited three
fact scenarios. At the low end of the conflict spectrum were the facts of Miree v.
87. Id. at 2515.
88. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's approach to the issue of a "uniquely federal" interest, particularly the analogy to the government's rights and obligations under its contracts. The
dissent stressed that the dispute in Boyle did not involve the United States, but rather two private
parties. For this reason the dissent found the analogy to the government's contract liability inapposite. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
"lawmaking" beyond the scope of judicial authority. Id. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stating
that the creation of new policy should be left to Congress, Stevens argued,
When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the
efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of
the individual-whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context-I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the
Congress.
Id.
89. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-30 (1978) (adopting state law
as the federal rule of law determining the priority of federal and private liens); United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594 (1973) (refusing to apply state law affecting mineral rights
in land acquired by the United States). The majority commented that the possible distinction between displacing state law and displacing federal incorporation of state law made no practical difference in Boyle, if it ever does. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515 n.3.
90.- Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515 (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69
(1969)).
91. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515-16. Justice Scalia briefly explicated the requirement that a conflict
exist for preemption to occur. The degree of conflict required depends on whether or not the suit
involves an area in which states traditionally govern. "ITihe fact that the area in question is one of
uniquely federal concern changes what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can." Id. The degree of conflict then determines the degree of preemption.
"[Wjhere the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the
area conflicts and is replaced by federal rules." Id. at 2516 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 362 (1943)). In other cases state law is superseded only to the extent that it frustrates federal policy.
92. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515.
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DeKalb County.93 In Miree the Court allowed a suit by private citizens against
the county as third party beneficiaries to the federal government's contract with
the county. 94 The state law allowing the suit did not conflict with the government's interests embodied in the contract because the claim attacked the
county's failure to perform adequately under the contract's terms. 95 The interwith the federal
ests of the citizens as third party beneficiaries actually coincided
96
interests involved. Preemption therefore was unnecessary.
The Boyle Court proposed a hypothetical middle ground case in which federal and state interests would not coincide, but also would not conflict. This
situation involved the federal government's purchase of an air conditioning unit
of a specific cooling capacity. 97 State statutes requiring the inclusion of certain
safety features in air conditioners would not conflict with the supplier's contractual duty to supply the government with a unit of the specified cooling capacity.
In this case the Court said "[tjhe contractor could comply with both its contractual obligations and the state prescribed duty of care. No one suggests that state
law would generally be pre-empted in this context." 9 8
Finally, the Court set forth as an example of direct conflict between state
law and federal interests the facts of Boyle itself. The Court summarized the
conflict:
Here the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted basis of the
contractor's liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with
the sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is
precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract
(the duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications). 99
The Court explained that the specifications provided the basis for finding a
strong federal interest in the design of the escape hatch.1°° No federal interest
would exist if a government employee merely ordered a helicopter by model
number from the seller's stock; in such a case preemption would not occur.10 1
Having demonstrated the potential for "significant conflict" with federal
policy posed by suits like Boyle, the Court turned to finding a principle to iden93. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
94. Id. at 28-30.
95. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. In Miree the county contracted with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restrict the use of land adjacent to an airport to activities that were compatible with the airport's operation. Miree, 433 U.S. at 27. Using the land as a garbage dump allegedly
attracted swarms of birds, which caused a plane to crash. Id. The suit concerned whether the
county had breached its contractual duty by operating a garbage dump.
96. Justice Brennan's dissent in Boyle proposed a different interpretation of Miree. Summarizing the holding of the case, he stated, "[W]e held that state law should govern the claim because
,only the rights of private litigants are at issue here,' and the claim against the county 'will have no
direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury.'" Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2522 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Miree, 433 U.S. at 29, 30).
97. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id at 2515-16.
101. Id. at 2516.
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tify those cases in which state law would conflict with federal policy. The
Bynum court relied on Feres-Stencel as the federal policy jeopardized in suits
against military suppliers.' 0 2 The Boyle majority eschewed this reasoning, commenting, "[T]he Feres doctrine, in its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some respects
too narrow."' 1 3 A Feres-based defense would produce overbroad results because consistency would require such a defense to bar all suits brought by
United States servicemen. At the same time the defense would not prevent civilians from challenging the design features of equipment that the military had
deemed most important and thus would produce overly narrow results. 104
Boyle identified a more appropriate measure of the federal interest embodied in government procurement contracts in the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 0 5 This exception reserves from the general
consent to suit contained in the Act any claim based on the performance of a
discretionary function by a federal agency or official. The Boyle Court characterized the selection of the design for military equipment as a discretionary function within the meaning of the Act and established the discretionary function
exception as the federal policy dictating the boundaries of preemption.106
Protecting the immunity afforded the government to perform a discretionary function mandates preemption of state product liability law in the context of
government procurement contracts, the Boyle court concluded. Government
contractor liability for government-specified designs would result in passthrough costs to the government, thereby undermining its immunity.10 7 As the
Court stated, "It makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial
liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it con' 08
tracts for the production."'
The final issue addressed by the Boyle Court was the appropriate formulation of the defense necessary to protect the exercise of governmental discretion
involved in military procurement contracts. The Court adopted substantially
the same test promulgated in McKay:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers
102. See supra notes 60-62 and acccompanying text.
103. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2517-18.
107. Id. at 2518. The majority appropriated the McKay court's cost pass-through reasoning to
support its discretionary function-based defense. Allowing contractor liability for defects in manufacture is not inconsistent with the cost pass-through rationale as it was under the McKay test. See
supra text accompanying notes 68-69. Mismanufacture of a product ordered by the government
clearly frustrates the exercise of discretion made in selecting the design of the product. Thus, contractor liability for defects in manufacture of a product does not conflict with the purposes of the
defense announced in Boyle.
108. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
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in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.10 9
According to Justice Scalia, the first two elements of this test serve to ensure that the design feature exists as a result of the government's exercise of its
discretion.110 The third element counters the disincentive to disclose dangers
created by the defense. Because disclosure might disrupt the contract but nondisclosure would have no effect in the absence of the third test element, the
disclosure requirement is necessary to induce openness by the contractor. 111
Boyle is unlikely to produce substantially different results than the McKay
defense in most cases. The decision, however, will result in greater consistency
of outcome across jurisdictions. As a consequence of its resolution of the statefederal law conflict in favor of preemption, the defense now has binding effect in
both state and federal courts.
Boyle does represent a significant transition in other regards. Although the
Supreme Court adopted the substance of the McKay defense, it rejected almost
entirely the reasoning of the McKay court in creating the defense.1 12 Because of
the change in focus from the Feres doctrine to the discretionary function exception, the government contractor defense now has greater logical consistency and
strength.
By establishing the government contractor defense as a direct corollary to
the discretionary function exception, the Boyle Court tightened the connection
between the consequences of the defense and its policy basis. If the defendant's
contract with the government provides the source of the guarded federal interest, then the defense logically should relate directly to the contract. It makes
little sense to distinguish the contractor's liability for the same equipment based
on the relationship between the plaintiff and the government. Boyle supplies
consistency of reasoning and result by conditioning liability on the defendant's
relationship with the government rather than the fortuity of the plaintiff's status
as military personnel or civilian.
Deriving the government contractor defense from Feres-Stencel produced
inconsistencies that are eliminated by realigning the defense according to the
discretionary function exception. Feres-Stencel immunity overlaps with discretionary function immunity; in many cases either alone would protect the government from suit. Feres-Stencel, however, specifically reflects the principle that
the relationship between the government and a member of the armed forces is
"'distinctively federal in character.' "113 The reasons to protect this distinctive
109. Id. This formulation differs slightly from the three elements, in addition to governmental
immunity under Feres-Stencel, set out in McKay. McKay used the language "established or approved reasonably precise specifications" and required disclosure of "patent errors in design" as well
as dangers not known to the government. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see supratext accompanying note 35 (enumerating the
four elements of the McKay test).
110. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).
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relationship are cast as a particularized statement of the discretionary function

exception: in military matters the federal government requires latitude to employ specialized expertise and to exercise decision-making power without imped-

iment.1 14 The specific nature of Feres-Stencel strained the application of the
derived government contractor defense when courts attempted to identify as-

pects of military discipline and order implicated in suits against equipment manufacturers."

5

Associating the defense with the more general principles of

discretionary function immunity alleviates this strain by establishing that government policy making in general, not military decision making in particular,
warrants protection of government contractors.
The Boyle Court's new justification for the government contractor defense
also gives the defense new strength. In recent years the Feres doctrine has fallen
into disfavor and its justifications have been narrowed to two concerns not even
identified in Feres itself: military discipline and separation of powers.1 16 In
practical terms the erosion of the Feres doctrine necessitated removing the government contractor defense to the higher ground of discretionary function

immunity.
Although the majority in Boyle fully explicated the change in derivation of
the government contractor defense, the opinion did not address the effect, if any,
this change will have on application of the actual elements of the defense. The
Court purported merely to accept the defense as formulated in McKay, without
attempting to clarify either the requisite degree of government involvement in
the design of the equipment or the standard of disclosure of risks imposed on the
contractor. 1 7 Some guidance exists in the majority's statement that the approval element isolates cases involving the performance of a discretionary func18
tion, and the disclosure requirement discourages contractor secrecy.'
The language of the McKay test adopted in Boyle clearly indicates that gov114. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 569 (1985). Discussing the relationship between the
special needs of the military and the government contractor defense, the Bynum court made the
following comments:
The purpose of a government contract defense... is to permit the government to wage war
in whatever manner the government deems advisable, and to do so with the support of
suppliers of military weapons. Considerations of cost, time of production, risks to participants, risks to third parties, and any other factors that might weigh on the decisions of
whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon are uniquely questions for the military
and should be exempt from review by civilian courts.
Id. at 569 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp 1046, 1054 n.l (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
115. See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565 (arguing that suits alleging defects in military equipment
"take identical form" whether the government or the contractor is the defendant); McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983) (arguing that allowing members of the
armed forces to testify regarding military decisions jeopardizes military discipline and national security), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). But see Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 742-43 (1Ith Cir. 1985) (rejecting the notion that civil suits against equipment manufacturers
potentially affect military discipline), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2896 (1988).
116. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (reassessing the Feres-Stencel doctrine
and concluding that a civil court is required to second-guess military discipline); Shaw, 778 F.2d at
742-43 (interpreting the second-guessing factor in Shearer as a "classic separation of powers
theory").
117. Boyle, 108 S.Ct. at 2518.
118. Id.
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ernment approval of contractor-developed designs can insulate the contractor
from liability for design defects. 119 Approval may not constitute the perform120
As the Boyle
ance of a discretionary function in every situation, however.
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ernment is necessary to satisfy the first element of the defense. The standard
must be developed by reference to the discretionary function exemption itself.
Each case will require a determination whether the alleged "approval" constitutes the performance of a discretionary function. 122 Only in those cases in
which the government actually played a discretionary role should the defense
succeed. 123
The degree of disclosure required of the contractor continues to be ambiguous after Boyle. In McKay the ambiguity arose out of the twofold requirement
that the contractor warn the government about all "patent errors in the government's specifications [and] about dangers involved in the use of the equipment
' 124
The Boyle
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States."
Court omitted the first half of this requirement, which suggests that it intended a
straightforward actual knowledge standard. 12 5 One can argue, however, that a
reasonable knowledge standard better promotes the interests of the defense.
119. The Boyle Court did not clarify the phrase "reasonably precise specifications" in the approval element of the defense. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989). In Smith the
Fifth Circuit resorted to pre-Boyle cases to determine the meaning of this standard. Id. The government in Smith had submitted environmental specifications for a weapon simulator used in military
training exercises. Id. at 138. At trial Xerox did not produce the drawings it had made based on the
government's specifications but did submit its contract which referred to government approved specifications. Id. On this evidence and the testimony of a government employee that the government
reviewed the plans offered by Xerox, the court held that the government had in fact "approved
reasonably precise specifications." Id.
In Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989), the court concluded that
the "reasonably precise specifications" standard ensures actual government discretion in approving a
design. The court implied that a high standard of detail and specificity of design comported with the
discretionary function justification for the government contractor defense. Id. at 1481. Commenting
on the relationship between the specification requirement and the exercise of government discretion,
the Trevino court stated, "If the government approved imprecise or general guidelines, then discretion over important design choices would be left to the government contractor." Id.
120. See Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1479.
121. Id. at 2516.
122. For an interpretation of the meaning of "discretionary function" under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, see cases cited supra note 22.
123. The Fifth Circuit held that government approval must amount to an exercise of discretion
to satisfy the Boyle government contractor defense in Trevino. The Trevino court found the strict
approval standard consistent with the basis of the government contractor defense in the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1481. In addition, the
court examined the elements of the defense as a whole. From this examination the court concluded
that the reasonably precise specification requirement and the contractor disclosure requirement contemplate active government evaluation. Id. at 1480-81. The court then affirmed the trial court's
determination that the mere signature by a government employee of each page of contractor designs
did not fulfill the government contractor defense's approval requirement. Id. at 1486.
124. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984).
125. See Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1487 ("After Boyle a government contractor is only responsible for
warning the government of dangers about which it has actual knowledge.").
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Holding the manufacturer to a reasonable knowledge standard with regard
to risks and alternatives would ensure not only more informed government decisions but more specific decisions. The conclusion that the government chose a
particular aspect of a detailed design follows most easily in cases in which the
government rejected an alternative proposed by the manufacturer. Moreover,
the actual knowledge standard encourages contractors to avoid knowledge of
risks and discourages thorough safety testing. This is particularly true in a bid
situation, where price competition creates further incentive to sidestep testing in
order to keep the bid low.
The actual knowledge standard, however, does enable the government to
limit the costs or time necessary to develop a particular piece of equipment by
forgoing extensive testing. Such a cost-benefit choice is an exercise of discretion
that warrants insulation of the contractor under the government contractor defense.126 The actual knowledge standard allows the government to dictate the
amount of testing done by the manufacturer without exposing the manufacturer
to liability for less than reasonable knowledge in the field. In addition, the actual knowledge standard accurately reflects the purpose of the disclosure requirement stated in Boyle: countering the incentive to withhold known risks in
order to obtain or preserve the contract.
The Boyle Court's commentary when choosing the McKay formulation of
the government contractor defense over the narrower formulation in Shaw
reveals a negative aspect of the new focus announced in Boyle. Regarding the
Shaw rule the Court stated, "While this formulation may represent a perfectly
reasonable tort rule, it is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the 'discretionary function' exemption."1 27 Thus, the Court conceded
that the new government contractor defense has less to do with theories of liability than with the practical concerns of governmental immunity. Theories of tort
liability generally correspond to notions of fairness, whereas governmental immunity precludes liability for the sake of pragmatism, disregarding the equities
of a given case. The discretionary function exception protects the government's
cost-benefit decisions and allows the government to act in the interest of society.
As a result, the exception often allows society to enjoy the benefits of the government's choices while imposing hardships or costs on an individual victim. As a
child of the discretionary function exception, the government contractor defense
inherits this disassociation from considerations of fairness.
Despite its aggravation of the hardships created by the discretionary function exception, the government contractor defense is valid in light of the former
doctrine. Some form of defense for the contractor who acts on the government's
judgment is necessary both out of fairness to the manufacturer and as a means of
protecting the government's immunity. The harsh results of the government
contractor defense on the individual did not originate with Boyle. The govern126. Cf. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814-20 (1984) (FAA's decision to allow
airlines to self-police safety by spotchecking planes constitutes performance of a discretionary
function).
127. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.

1989]

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

1189

ment contractor defense based on Feres-Stencel produced similar results in more

limited circumstances. The most important question after Boyle, therefore, is
the scope of the defense in light of its new justification in discretionary function

immunity.
The new premise of the defense provides greater potential for application
outside the field of military contracts than did the McKay defense. As Justice
Brennan argued in his dissent in Boyle,
The contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by
military personnel like Lt. Boyle, or Government employees, but by
anyone injured by a Government contractor's negligent design, including, for example, the children who might have died had respondent's
helicopter crashed on the beach. It applies even if the Government has
not intentionally sacrificed safety for other interests like speed or effi-

ciency, and, indeed, even if the equipment is not of a type that is typically considered dangerous ....[T]he defense is invocable regardless
of how blatant or easily remedied the defect, so long as the contractor
missed it and the specifications approved by the Government, however

unreasonably dangerous, were "reasonably precise."

128

The precise wording of the majority's opinion suggests that Justice Brennan's assessment of the "breathtakingly sweeping" 129 scope of the defense is an
exaggeration. Justice Scalia tailored the scope of the majority opinion to the
circumstances of the case, stating at the outset, "This case requires us to decide

when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can
be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect." 1 30 The

elements of the defense likewise apply specifically to a manufacturer of military
13 1
equipment for the government.

Although the exact elements of the Boyle test apply only in the context of
military suppliers, Justice Brennan is correct in that the decision provides ample
leeway for extension by analogy. 132 Both the preemption argument and the discussion of the federal policy embodied in the discretionary function exception
128. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2513. The formulation of the Boyle defense also indicates that the government contractor defense continues to apply only to design defects and does not preclude liability for defects in
manufacture. See McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t
remains the law of this Circuit that military contractor immunity does not apply in cases of defective
manufacture.").
131. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. Justice Scalia introduced the elements of the defense with a
limitation to the facts of the case: "Liability for design defects in military equipment can not be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when ...." Id.
132. After Boyle the government contractor defense applies to civilian as well as military plaintiffs. Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 637 (5th Cir. 1989). In Garner a civilian employed by a
shipyard to paint Navy destroyers brought suit against the manufacturer of the epoxy paint used in
his job. Id. at 631. The court held that the paint manufacturer was entitled to the government
contractor defense despite the plaintiff's nonmilitary status. Id. at 637. The Garner court also noted
the government contractor defense's potential applicability to manufacturers of nonmilitary equipment. Id. Avoiding the issue, the court stated, "At present we do not decide whether the government contractor defense applies to any specific product but only state that paint which is used on
Navy Iran destroyers specifically because of its anti-corrosive qualities fits within the parameters of
military equipment." Id. at 637-38.
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exceed the requirements of the facts of the case. In addition the shift from FeresStencel indicates that special deference to military decisions no longer governs
the defense's application. Governmental decision making in general now deter1 33
mines the potential scope of the defense.
The broad interest identified in Boyle as "uniquely federal" in characterthe interest in "getting the government's work done"134 -is implicated in many
government contracts that are not specifically military in character. A government contractor's liability to third persons potentially implicates both the government's rights under its contracts and its ability to accomplish specific ends.
When such liability runs contrary to an identifiable federal policy, preemption
will occur. The federal policy protected in Boyle, the discretionary function exception, may apply to a great many contexts. Whether the government contracts for the operation of a nuclear power plant, the disposal of toxic waste, or
the construction of a highway, Boyle's government contractor defense can affect
the contractor's potential liability. The specific elements of the Boyle test will
not relate to every situation, but by analogy some form of government contractor defense could apply.
Boyle provides guidance for the identification of nonmilitary cases in which
government contractor liability would directly jeopardize the performance of a
discretionary function. Justice Scalia's delineation of Boyle's conflict between
the state-imposed duty of care and the duty to supply a helicopter with the escape hatch described in the contract specifications 3 - indicates that specific conflict is necessary for the defense to operate. Thus, Boyle restricts application of
the government contractor defense to cases in which a similarly specific conflict
is involved. This strict conflict requirement is the only significant limitation on
the defense put forth in Boyle, but it should suffice to prevent the unlimited
contractor immunity predicted by the dissent.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. lays the foundation for further development of the government contractor defense. Not only does the decision lend
Supreme Court certification to a doctrine already enjoying widespread acceptance, Boyle fortifies the defense through its reliance on discretionary function
immunity. The defense now combines the capacity to preempt state tort law
with a category of sovereign immunity that is unlikely to suffer attrition due to
judicial or legislative disfavor.
Future decisions interpreting Boyle ultimately will determine what balance
the government contractor defense strikes between protecting governmental decisions and compensating personal losses. If this balance proves inequitable, the
Court may have to modify the defense to reduce its emphasis on the interests of
the government. For the present, Boyle significantly clarifies and aligns the origins, purposes, and application of the government contractor defense.
JOANNE MARIE LYONS
133. See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479 (1989).
134. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
135. Id. at 2516. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.

